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INTRODUCTION
The federal government has encouraged local police to assist in
apprehending, detaining, and removing undocumented immigrants
living in the United States ever since the 1980s. State governments, by
† Azadeh Shahshahani is the Legal and Advocacy Director with Project South. She is a past
president of the National Lawyers Guild and previously directed the National
Security/Immigrants’ Rights Project at the ACLU of Georgia. She is the editor of two reports on
287(g) in Georgia and a co-author of the report “Prejudice, Policing, and Public Safety: The
Impact of Immigration Hyper-Enforcement in the State of Georgia” published in July 2014. She
is also the author of the chapter “Immigration and Racial Profiling” in the 3rd and 4th editions of
the book Cultural Issues in Criminal Defense published in August 2010 and June 2015,
respectively. The author wishes to thank John Folkerth, Lauren Schenkel, and Christina Zeidan
for their research help with this article.

105

Shahshahani.2017 (Do Not Delete)

106

8/18/2017 12:44 PM

C A R D OZ O LA W R E V I E W D E • N OV O

[2017

themselves, do not have the authority to directly regulate immigrants’
presence or immigration; that power belongs to the federal government
pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce
Clause, among other sources. However, federal officials have
permitted—sometimes even coerced—states to “cooperate” in reporting
undocumented immigrants and aiding in “identification, apprehension,
detention, or removal” of these immigrants.1
As a practical matter, this cooperation appears not to have been
limited in its scope because of the way the entanglement operates. The
various mechanisms used in support of immigration enforcement
objectives are damaging to the communities in which they operate.
Racial profiling, a marked violation of the protections afforded by the
U.S. Constitution, is one such common mechanism that local police
employ to achieve federally-guided immigration objectives. Moreover,
local police entanglement of this kind wastes resources and hinders
police efforts to effectively protect local communities because of the
lost trust between immigrants and the police.
The following sections of this Article detail the types of police
involvement and the associated impact that these immigration
enforcement objectives have on local communities. Prime examples of
programs that operate (or used to operate) specifically within the State
of Georgia include: Section 287(g), Secure Communities, and the
Priority Enforcement Program.
I. SECTION 287(G)
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) established the guiding principles of Section 287(g)
programming in 1996.2 Section 287(g), as incorporated within the
Immigration National Act (INA) and amended by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, grants the U.S. Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agency the power to enter into Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) with state and local enforcement agencies so
that local police may perform specific immigration enforcement
functions.3 The specific enforcement functions are limited to those set
within the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of each MOU between
ICE and the individual state entity or county. Authorized local
personnel responsibilities include, but are not limited to: interrogating
any person detained; serving warrants of arrest for immigration
1
2
3

8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(B) (2012).
Id. at § 1357(g).
Id.
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violations; administering oaths and taking evidence; preparing charging
documents; and detaining and transporting arrested immigrants to ICEapproved detention facilities. The power to enter into these agreements
stems from the Secretary of Homeland Security’s ability to delegate
such authority to ICE. Currently, four jurisdictions in Georgia, namely
Cobb, Gwinnett, Whitfield, and Hall, operate under an MOU.
Although the program was initially intended to combat violent
crime and felonies, such as gang activity and drug trafficking, Section
287(g) has instead undermined public safety. Immigrant communities
are now more hesitant to report crimes because of concerns regarding
deportation. According to both the Major Cities Chiefs Association and
the Police Foundation, participants in the 287(g) program are harming,
rather than helping, community policing efforts.4 In Georgia, the impact
has been felt most acutely in Cobb County, Gwinnett County, Hall
County, and Whitfield County—all of which, as stated above, have
agreed to comply with ICE’s 287(g) terms of engagement.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Foundation of
Georgia in 2009 documented this trend in a report titled: Terror and
Isolation in Cobb: How Unchecked Police Power Under 287(g) Has
Torn Families Apart and Threatened Public Safety.5 The report included
interviews with ten community members affected by the program as
well as community advocates and attorneys based in Cobb County. 6
For immigrants living in Cobb County, Section 287(g) has not only
decreased willingness to report crimes, but also increased the levels of
community mistrust in law enforcement officials. For instance, one
community member named Joanna mentioned that she had to put out a
fire in her kitchen by herself because she was afraid to call 911.7
Joanna’s commentary highlights the amount of fear and mistrust many
of her fellow immigrants’ experience, even when they, themselves, are
the victims. The Latin American Association’s Director of Policy and
Advocacy, David Shaefer, echoed similar concerns in a recent hearing
in Gwinnett County, stating that the program “may lead to under
reporting of crimes for fear that those who contact the Sheriff’s Office
may” be deported.8 The 287(g) program contributes to diminished
4 DANYELLE SOLOMON, TOM JAWETZ, & SANAM MALIK, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF ENTANGLING LOCAL POLICING AND IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT (2017), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2017/03/20140134/
LawEnforcementSanctuary-brief.pdf.
5 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF GA., TERROR AND ISOLATION IN COBB: HOW
UNCHECKED POLICE POWER UNDER 287(G) HAS TORN FAMILIES APART AND THREATENED
PUBLIC SAFETY (Azadeh Shahshahani ed. 2009), https://www.aclu.org/other/terror-and-isolationcobb-how-unchecked-police-power-under-287g-has-torn-families-apart-and.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 11.
8 Curt Yeomans, Commissioners Approve Immigration Detainment Agreement Amid
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public safety for all Georgia residents.
The 287(g) program further hinders local law enforcement’s ability
to combat violent crimes and other related felonies. Local officials must
instead reallocate their limited financial resources towards the MOU
objectives. In Gwinnett County, the current MOU (in effect as of June
2016)9 indicates that Gwinnett is responsible for all expenses, such as
salaries, benefits, etc., of the personnel participating under the terms of
the MOU.10 The Gwinnett County Sheriff’s Department must also
provide, at no cost to ICE, an office within the department from which
ICE supervisory employees may work.11 Additionally, the Sheriff’s
Department will be held responsible and will bear any costs of its
participating personnel with regard to expenses incurred by reason of
death, injury, or incidents giving rise to liability. 12
In Cobb County, immigrants disappear into detention for violations
such as having a broken tail light or tinted windows on their car.
Between 2008 and the beginning of 2012, 6,274 individuals were held
on detainer for ICE in Cobb County.13 Out of those held on detainer,
4,538 had not been convicted of any crime.14 Since 2009, Gwinnett
County has held 13,346 people on detainer for ICE pursuant to 287(g),
according to the Sheriff’s Office website.15 Of those, approximately half
(6,788 people) were detained for traffic violations and some for only
driver’s license violations.16
The program has also historically promoted and served as a
justification for racial profiling and human rights violations, even
though some MOUs, such as Gwinnett’s, require that local enforcement
“show an ability to meet and deal with people of differing backgrounds
and behaviors.”17 Nonetheless, as Schaefer noted, in Gwinnett County
“287(g) is undermining public trust in law enforcement . . . especially in

Opposition, GWINNETT DAILY POST (June 21, 2016), http://www.gwinnettdailypost.com/local/
crime/commissioners-approve-immigration-detainment-agreement-amid-opposition/
article_934a7096-e757-5738-9225-5471c451b08c.html.
9 Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Gwinnett Cty.
Sheriff’s
Dep’t
&
ICE,
(June
30,
2016),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/
memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/r_287ggwinnetcountyso.pdf [hereinafter MOU].
10 Per discussion with national experts, local sheriffs’ offices elsewhere also typically have to
pay all expenses of the personnel carrying out the tasks under the MOU.
11 MOU, supra note 9.
12 Id.
13 Transactional Recs. Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) Immigration, Who Are the Targets of
ICE Detainers?, TRAC REPORTS, INC. (Feb. 20, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/
310.
14 Id.
15 Yeomans, supra note 8.
16 Id.
17 MOU, supra note 9, at 2.
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the Latin American community.”18
There is no meaningful check in place to ensure that local law
enforcement does not abuse 287(g)’s program protocols. A U.S.
Government Accountability Office investigation in 2009 found ICE was
not exercising proper oversight over local or state agencies.19
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) also issued a report in 2010
highlighting the targeting of community members who have not
committed any crimes. Less than ten percent of those sampled by OIG
were ICE “Level 1” offenders.20 Almost half had no involvement in
crimes of violence, drug offenses, or property crimes.21
The practice of law enforcement agencies targeting low level
offenders and non-offenders raises concern over the use of racial
profiling in the implementation of 287(g). In Georgia, for example, both
Gwinnett and Cobb counties have had many documented instances of
racial profiling by officers in the implementation of 287(g)
agreements.22 Reports from these counties have found “‘that police
officers are targeting immigrants and people of color for stops, searches,
and interrogations,’ under the guise of traffic violations.”23 The OIG
also documented other problems, such as a lack of state and local
supervision as well as a lack of sufficient training.24
Compounding the 287(g) problem is the fact that Georgia does not
have any state legislation banning racial profiling or mandating
accountability or transparency for law enforcement.25 Georgia has
deported thousands of people and separated countless families in the
process. Statistics from a 2014 report by the ACLU of Georgia, the
Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, and other groups echoed
Yeomans, supra note 8.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:
BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT
OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf.
20 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE PERFORMANCE OF
287(G) AGREEMENTS (2010), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-63_Mar10.pdf.
21 Id.
22 Letter from Azadeh Shahshahani, Nat’l Sec./Immigrants’ Rights Project Dir., Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Ga., to the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 24, 2010), https://
www.acluga.org/sites/default/files/287g_dhs_complaint.pdf.
23 Id. at 2.
24 Memorandum from Deborah L. Outten-Mills, Acting Assistant Inspector Gen. for
Inspections, to Timothy Moynihan, Assistant Dir., Office of Prof’l Responsibility for
Immigration and Customs Enf’t (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/
OIG_12-130_Sep12.pdf.
25 But see Ga. Code Ann § 17-5-100(d) (2016) (“A peace officer shall not consider race,
color, or national origin in implementing the requirements of this Code section except to the
extent permitted by the Constitutions of Georgia and of the United States.”). § 17-5-100 pertains
to investigating immigration status. See id. The provision quoted is not a ban on racial profiling in
law enforcement activities generally, and it can be easily ignored because it includes no
enforcement mechanism. Thus, it does not mandate accountability or transparency.
18
19
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this conclusion, noting that in Georgia, between 2007 and 2013, ICE
took custody of 11,421 undocumented spouses of U.S. citizens and
some 40,000 children witnessed their parents being taken into custody
due to their undocumented status.26 In the context of these statistics,
Schafer encouraged Gwinnett County officials to answer the question:
“And how much good does it do us to be taking parents out of families
when we’ve got a situation where these families are already struggling
to make a living when we’re effectively taking the wage earner out of
the home?”27
Many members of the community mirror this sentiment in finding
that 287(g) is “separating families. It is undermining trust in the
community.”28 Between 2006 and April 2012, federal officials deported
14,831 people via the 287(g) program.29 Unsurprisingly, Georgia ranks
high based on the total number of deportations as compared to other
U.S. states.30
Participation in the 287(g) program in Georgia and across the
United States can be expected to increase with President Trump
prioritizing expansion of the program in a January 2017 executive
order.31 The Trump administration considers the 287(g) program to be
“a highly successful force multiplier” and alleges that the program led
to identification of 402,000 removable persons from January 2006 to
September 2015, “primarily through encounters at local jails.”32 The
Director of ICE and Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection are authorized to engage with law enforcement jurisdictions
that are willing and qualified to enter into 287(g) agreements.33 The
Director and Commissioner are to take into account the capabilities and
resources of the jurisdictions and structure an agreement that “employs
the most effective enforcement model for that jurisdiction.”34 This

26 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF GA. ET AL., PREJUDICE, POLICING AND PUBLIC
SAFETY: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION HYPER-ENFORCEMENT IN THE STATE OF GEORGIA
(2014),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/
Prejudice_Policing_Public%20Safety.pdf [hereinafter PREJUDICE, POLICING AND PUBLIC
SAFETY].
27 Yeomans, supra note 8.
28 Id.
29 Jeremy Redmon, Georgia Highly Active in Deportations, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 8,
2012), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/georgia-highly-active-in-deportations/nQSrk.
30 Id.
31 See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
32 See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, Customs and Border Prot., et al. 4 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-BorderSecurity-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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includes jail enforcement and taking advantage of other state services.35
This renewed focus on Section 287(g) can be expected to drain state and
local resources and result in further deterioration of community trust in
local police.
II. HOUSE BILL 87
In 2011, Georgia Governor Nathan Deal signed Georgia’s Illegal
Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act, House Bill (HB) 87.36 The
bill authorizes Georgia law enforcement to ask about immigration status
when questioning suspects during criminal investigations.37 More
specifically, HB 87 allows police to inquire whether an individual has
appropriate immigration or citizenship papers and to determine the
protocols for how to investigate a suspected individual (the “show me
your papers” provision).38 Civil rights groups challenged the legislation
before implementation, arguing that HB 87 violated constitutional rights
and promoted the use of racial profiling. Many activists compared HB
87 to Arizona’s “Show Me Your Papers” legislation. In effect, HB 87
compels Georgia residents to carry identification with them at all times.
Not only does HB 87 empower police officials to determine who
they seek to question regarding citizenship or immigration status, but it
permits them to determine the type of information that will suffice to
prove a suspect’s identity. This process by its very nature invites the
racial profiling of residents who appear foreign.
In this way, HB 87 violates the Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides equal protection and due process for all.
When civil rights groups challenged HB 87 in court, Judge Thomas
Thrash for the Northern District of Georgia quickly ruled in favor of
enjoining key provisions, including the “Show Me Your Papers”
provision. However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court’s decision by lifting the temporary injunction.
The court however acknowledged HB 87’s potential for abuse,
especially with regard to the “Show Me Your Papers” provision.
After the bill signing, Governor Nathan Deal said that “[t]his
legislation is a responsible step forward in the absence of federal
action . . . . Illegal immigration places an incredible burden on Georgia
taxpayers.”39 In reality though, HB 87 has done significant harm to
Id. at 4–5.
H.R. 87, 151st Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011).
See id.
See id.
Gustavo Valdes, Georgia Governor Signs Controversial Anti-Illegal Immigration Law,
CNN (May 13, 2011 4:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/13/georgia.immigration.law/
35
36
37
38
39
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Georgia residents by way of impacting the local economy. Georgia
farmers have historically relied on the immigrant workforce. According
to the Georgia Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association, HB 87 posed
the risk of a loss of approximately $391 million and 3,260 jobs over the
long-run.40 This devastating loss includes not only those members of the
Georgia community who actually farm the land, transport, and sell
produce, and run the business, but also those Georgia residents who
purchase groceries from their local market or grocery store.
The Valdosta Daily Times echoed similar sentiments with its
editorial titled Solving the Farm Crisis:
Maybe this should have been prepared for, with farmers’ input.
Maybe the state should have discussed the ramifications with those
directly affected. Maybe the immigration issue is not as easy as ‘send
them home,’ but is a far more complex one in that maybe Georgia
needs them, relies on them, and cannot successfully support the
state’s No. 1 economic engine without them.41

The cost associated with HB 87 is not limited to the monetary
impact; the bill has had an equally costly social impact. After Georgia
passed HB 87, the ACLU of Georgia and the Georgia Latino Alliance
for Human Rights (GLAHR) held forums across the state. These forums
took place during the Summer of 2011 until the Spring of 2012, and
included a focus group of twenty-two individuals answering questions
revolving around community fear and mistrust because of HB 87’s
passage. The responses to various questions showcase just how
detrimental HB 87 was to the community within its first year of
implementation. For instance, ten members of the group responded that
they no longer felt safe in their communities; another fourteen members
responded that they avoided certain areas of the community due to
police surveillance and harassment; and another eight indicated that
they avoided calling enforcement officials due to concerns over their
immigration status.
Until it is repealed, House Bill 87 will continue to damage Georgia
communities by inhibiting a safe environment for all.

index.html.
40 Azadeh Shahshahani, HB 87 Negatively Impacts Georgia Economy and Reputation,
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/azadeh-shahshahani/georgia-immigrationpolicy_b_1528987.html (last updated July 21, 2012).
41 Solving the Farm Crisis, THE VALDOSTA DAILY TIMES (June 16, 2011), http://
www.valdostadailytimes.com/opinion/solving-the-farm-crisis/article_00ac0c13-1f1d-5aac-b5e4a005c4fc30cd.html.
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III. SECURE COMMUNITIES
The Secure Communities program first went into effect statewide
on December 6, 2011. The program permits local or state police to
fingerprint an arrested individual, and then share that information with
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ascertain the
individual’s immigration history.42 Once local police arrest and book an
individual for a criminal violation, they submit the individual’s
fingerprints to the FBI for criminal history and warrant checks. 43 The
program licenses this same biometric data to be sent to ICE from the
FBI to determine if the individual is a “high-risk” or priority for
removal from the United States.44 Outcry over the program led to its
dismantling and replacement in 2014, but President Trump authorized
its return in a January 2017 executive order.45 The discussion below
details the events that led to Secure Communities’ demise and the
consequences brought about while it was in effect.
In practice, the Secure Communities program encourages law
enforcement officials to arrest foreign-born individuals for any reason
whatsoever, including traffic infractions, regardless of prior criminal
history (e.g., no criminal history). Additionally, there have been reports
of racial profiling used by the officers in making these stops. According
to a 2014 NBC News report, “immigrants have described being asked
for ID, then handcuffed and fingerprinted, while walking on the street,
standing in their front yard, or driving through checkpoints”.46 Latino
U.S. citizens have reported being stopped to be fingerprinted, only to be
let go once their fingerprints reveal their citizenship. According to the
data ICE released in November 2009, of the 113,000 non-citizens
identified during the program’s first year of implementation, more than
101,000 (or close to ninety percent) were never charged with or
convicted of dangerous crimes.47 Out of those detained, an alarming five
percent were actually U.S. citizens, testifying to the inaccuracy and
incompleteness of DHS’s databases.48
The program was also profoundly susceptible to abuse and racial
42 See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://
www.ice.gov/secure-communities.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 § 10(a) (Jan. 25, 2017).
46 Hannah Rappleye & Lisa Riordan Seville, Does High-Tech Dragnet to Deport Immigrants
Go Too Far?, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/doeshigh-tech-dragnet-deport-immigrants-go-too-far-n40306.
47 Azadeh Shahshahani, ICE’s Misplaced Priorities: The Numbers Speak for Themselves and
the Stories Cry out for Justice, HUFFINGTON POST (July 7, 2010), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/azadeh-shahshahani/ices-misplaced-priorities_b_567536.html.
48 Id.
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profiling, similar to the misguided 287(g) program. In a 2012 report
entitled Guidance on State and Local Governments’ Assistance in
Immigration Enforcement and Related Matters, DHS asserted that
“State governments mandating that state or local law enforcement
officers inquire into the immigration status of a specified group or
category of individuals” was impermissible.49 However, local police
officers or sheriff’s deputies could still arrest an individual simply to
bring him or her to the attention of immigration officials. This lack of
oversight created an unacceptably high risk for the unlawful use of
racial profiling against individuals of certain nationalities.
In response, more than 350 localities across the country challenged
the program by passing resolutions and putting in place policies to limit
cooperation with ICE in the implementation of Secure Communities.
Three counties in Georgia, including Fulton County, joined the
challenge. In September 2014, the Fulton County Board of
Commissioners moved to limit the county’s compliance with ICE
“detainer” requests, which sought to hold a jailed immigrant beyond the
standard time allotment so that federal officials could investigate the
individual’s immigration status before release.50
The Commissioners were right to question the practice. Federal
court decisions made it clear that local law enforcement agencies that
detained individuals on the sole authority of an ICE detainer request
violated the Fourth Amendment, unless there was evidence of probable
cause to justify the detention.51 Since detaining someone for ICE
49 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’
ASSISTANCE IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND RELATED MATTERS 14 , https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/guidance-state-local-assistance-immigration-enforcement.pdf (last updated July
16, 2015).
50 Jeremy Redmon, Fulton Commissioners Urge Sheriff to Stop Cooperating with ICE,
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/
fulton-commissioners-urge-sheriff-to-stop-cooperat/nhFdW.
51 See, e.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL
1414305, at *11 (D. Ore. Apr. 11, 2014) (holding that county violated the Fourth Amendment by
relying on an ICE detainer that did not provide probable cause regarding removability); Morales
v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29 (D.R.I. 2014) (concluding that detention pursuant to an
immigration detainer “for purposes of mere investigation is not permitted”); see also Moreno v.
Napolitano, No. 11-C-5452, 2014 WL 4814776 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (denying judgment on
the pleadings to the government on plaintiffs’ claim that ICE’s detainer procedures violate
probable cause requirements); Gonzalez v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. CV-1304416 BRO (FFMx), 2014 WL 12605368, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2014) (granting the
government’s motion to dismiss, but allowing plaintiffs to file an amended complaint and noting
that plaintiffs “have sufficiently pleaded that Defendants exceeded their authorized power” by
issuing “immigration detainers without probable cause resulting in unlawful detention”); Villars
v. Kubiatowski, No. 12-CV-4586, 2014 WL 1795631, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2014) (rejecting
dismissal of Fourth Amendment claims concerning an ICE detainer issued “without probable
cause that Villars committed a violation of immigration laws”); Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10-cv06815, 2012 WL 1080020, at *14–15 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 30, 2012) (denying qualified immunity to
immigration officials for unlawful detention on an immigration detainer issued without probable
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constitutes a new arrest, there must be probable cause of a new
offense.52 ICE detainers, by themselves, do not provide a
constitutionally valid basis for local law enforcement officers to detain
individuals beyond release from state custody. The courts also ruled that
local authorities need not comply with ICE detainer requests.53
Moreover, involvement of local police in immigration enforcement
has been shown to actually harm public safety. Two law professors at
the University of Chicago and New York University conducted a study
and found that Secure Communities had zero effect on the crime rate.54
Secure Communities instead alienated community members from local
police; it made them afraid to report crime and cooperate with
investigations. In short, the program precipitated an environment where
all were in fact less safe.
The Georgia-specific study55 referred to above also revealed
troubling patterns in the implementation of Secure Communities. From
2007 to 2013, ICE detainers in Georgia rose from seventy-five in 2007
to 12,952 through June 2013.56 Moreover, 96.4 percent of those targeted
in 2013 were of “dark or medium complexion,” up from 66.7 percent in
2007.57 In comparison, from 2007 to 2013, ICE placed an immigration
hold on only 1.6 percent of individuals with fair or light complexions.58
This report and others have documented the chilling effect this program
has had on people’s confidence in the police with regard to racial
profiling and the safety risk associated with so many residents living in
fear of deportation.
The resolution by Fulton officials asking the sheriff to limit
compliance with ICE detainers was a good first step to ensure that
public safety remains the priority. However, the positive impact of
moves such as this, without continued advocacy, is sure to be stymied
by the return of Secure Communities.

cause); Uroza v. Salt Lake City, No. 2:11CV713DAK, 2013 WL 653968, at *6–7 (D. Utah Feb.
21, 2013) (denying dismissal on qualified immunity grounds where plaintiff claimed to have been
held on an immigration detainer issued without probable cause). Cf Makowski v. United States,
27 F.Supp.3d 901, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (concluding that plaintiff stated a plausible false
imprisonment claim against the United States where he was held on a detainer without probable
cause).
52 See supra note 51.
53 See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that immigration
detainers are permissive).
54 Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime?
Evidence from Secure Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937 (2014).
55 PREJUDICE, POLICING AND PUBLIC SAFETY, supra note 26.
56 Id. at 10.
57 Id. at 14.
58 Id.
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IV. PRIORITY ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
When the Department of Homeland Security decided to
discontinue Secure Communities, it replaced it with the Priority
Enforcement Program (PEP).59 Former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson
issued this change in a Memorandum titled Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants.60
According to the Memorandum, PEP’s purpose was to permit state and
local law enforcement agencies to transfer individuals who were in local
custody and were otherwise about to be released to DHS custody. 61
If ICE desired to take action against the arrested individual, then an
ICE officer was required to submit a notification request to local police
upon receipt of the identifying fingerprint. This notification requested
that the local jail notify ICE officials prior to releasing the individual
named in the request.62 ICE could also request that the local jail hold the
individual longer so that ICE may transport them to their facility. This
process worked the same way as Secure Communities did.
A proposed agreement from 2015 between Fulton County and ICE
sought to further expand PEP’s scope to include stationing federal
immigration agents at the Fulton County jail.63 The Southern Poverty
Law Center uncovered the Memorandum of Understanding through an
open records request.64
The agreement is inconsistent with how the department previously
represented the Priority Enforcement Program to states. The proposal
would require the Fulton Sheriff to: allow the ICE Liaison Officer to
work at the Fulton County Jail Monday through Friday; provide a work
area for the ICE officer to perform ICE functions; and offer copies of
supporting documentation, such as police reports, judgments, conviction
records, etc., when available.65 Having ICE officials present at the jails
provides a particular concern, since it can lead to the officials using
59 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas
S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, et al., Secure Communities
(Nov.
20,
2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf.
60 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas
S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, et al., Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf.
61 Id.
62 Life Under “PEP-Comm,” IMMIGR. LEGAL RESOURCE CTR., https://www.ilrc.org/sites/
default/files/resources/life_under_pepcomm_2016_update.pdf (last updated 2016).
63 Elise Foley, An Immigration Agent Could Be Placed in Georgia Jail, to Activists’ Dismay,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ice-agent-georgiajail_us_5612db2be4b0af3706e1bf30.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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deceptive tactics, such as coercion, misinformation, or threats, to induce
immigrants to give up their rights.66 A California case titled LopezVenegas v Johnson illustrates this concern, in that Ms. Lopez-Venegas
was coerced into giving up her right to see a judge after immigration
officials threatened that her autistic son would be detained if she did not
sign a voluntary return form giving up her right.67
Agreement to this Memorandum would reverse the progress made
by the 2014 resolution. As mentioned previously, Fulton County
officials passed the resolution as a mechanism to limit the Sheriff’s
compliance with ICE detainer requests. The belief was that this progress
would be a good first step to ensure public safety. However, this newlyproposed Memorandum would set Georgia’s immigrant communities
back.
Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights’ Executive Director,
Adelina Nicholls, has been vocal regarding the effect PEP has had on
Georgia residents: “We defeat Secure Communities nationally and now
we have to defeat Priorities Enforcement Program . . . . We are finding
that what they are saying in guidelines and in policy is not what is
happening in the real world.”68 According to Ms. Nicholls, ICE has
been moving more quickly than ever to detain and deport immigrants.
A recent study has shed further light on PEP. This report,69 which
relies on analysis from government records aggregated from the first
two months of the federal fiscal year (FY) 2016, shows that ICE
officials are issuing detainer requests for people without a criminal
record “at a slightly higher rate than before.”70 More specifically, nearly
half of the detainer requests to date in FY 2016 “target individuals who
have no criminal record” or background.71 Only twenty-five percent
were found to have committed a Level 1 crime.72 The government was
thus not directing its efforts toward detaining high-risk individuals
through PEP as claimed, but instead appears to be focusing on low-risk
66 Families Separated by Coercive Immigration Practices May Be Reunited in U.S., AM. C.L.
UNION (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/news/families-separated-coercive-immigrationpractices-may-be-reunited-us.
67 Id.; see also First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Lopez-Venegas v. Johnson (No. 2:13-cv-03972-JAK-PLA), 2013 WL
5997007 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2013).
68 Foley, supra note 63.
69 The report was issued by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at
Syracuse University, and used case-by-case information to develop conclusions surrounding the
Priority Enforcement Program.
70 Renee Feltz, Half of Immigrants Held in US ‘Priority’ Program Have No Criminal
Conviction, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/
11/us-immigration-detainees-criminal-background?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Gmail.
71 TRAC Immigration, Reforms of ICE Detainer Program Largely Ignored by Field Officers,
TRAC REPORTS, INC. (Aug. 9, 2016), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/432.
72 Id.
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convictions for drunk driving, miscellaneous assault, and simple traffic
violations.
The report also showcases how nearly eighty percent of detainers
still requested that the individual be detained “beyond the[] normal
period,” leaving the counties to bear all the risk of liability as well as the
costs of detention.73 This is the case even though a major reform
introduced by Secretary Johnson as part of PEP was for ICE officials to
request “notices” instead of extended detainers or holds. 74 Secretary
Johnson’s reform initiatives therefore did not impact the day-to-day
operations of ICE officials in the field. PEP still targeted people who
had not committed any crimes, continued to incentivize racial profiling,
further entangled local law enforcement with ICE, and allowed for
detention that is non-compliant with the Fourth Amendment.75
PEP stood as nothing more than a redux of Secure Communities,
and, at its core, re-integrated federal and local law enforcement for the
express purpose of immigration tracking and deportation. Though PEP
has been terminated, the return of Secure Communities threatens to
exacerbate mistrust for authorities, continue to tear apart families, and
further compromise community safety.
CONCLUSION
Under Trump, the priority memo has been officially rescinded.76
All “criminal aliens” are prioritized under the new enforcement
scheme.77 In addition, expedited removal proceedings will be initiated
against immigrants incarcerated in federal, state, and local correctional
facilities “[t]o the maximum extent possible.”78 The effects of these
ramped up enforcement efforts remain to be seen, but if the past is any
indication, these efforts will leave communities divided, stretched thin,
and insecure.

Id.
Id.
Priority Enforcement Program: Why ‘PEP’ Doesn’t Fix S-Comm’s Failings, NAT’L
IMMIGR. L. CTR. (June 2015), https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforcement/pepnotafix.
76 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., et al., Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to
Serve the National Interest 2 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf.
77 Id. at 3.
78 Id.
73
74
75

